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"A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. "I
INTRODUCTION
In CIA v. Sims,2 the United States Supreme Court held that the CIA
could withhold information about controversial government-sponsored
psychological experiments in response to Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests.3 The Court reasoned that the requested information
would reveal intelligence sources related to national defense, which were
specifically protected from disclosure under the National Security Act of
1947.4 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the CIA could refuse to
disclose the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which allows
withholding of information "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute."5
Numerous scholars assailed Sims, arguing that the Court's broad reading
of the National Security Act gave the CIA carte blanche to withhold
information and operate with no accountability.6 Sims' implications,
however, go far beyond giving the CIA the ability to conceal its activities
from scrutiny. Sims relied, in part, on a controversial theory known as
mosaic theory-the notion that the government may withhold otherwise
trivial or innocuous information because it might prove dangerous if
combined with other information by a knowledgeable actor (especially a
hostile intelligence agency). Reliance on mosaic theory expands the
universe of exempt information and often leads to non-disclosure of
information that otherwise would have been disclosed.
1. This quotation is a common adaptation of Alexander Pope's "A little learning is a
dangerous thing." ALEXANDER POPE, An Essay on Criticism, in POETRY AND PROSE OF
ALEXANDER POPE 37, 44 (Aubrey Williams ed., 1969).
2. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
4. Sims, 471 U.S. at 173; see also 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d) (2000) (granting to the director
of the Central Intelligency Agency (CIA) the power to collect intelligence through human
and other sources).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
6. See generally Brent Filbert, Freedom of Information Act: CIA v. Sims, The CIA Is
Given Broad Powers to Withhold the Identities of Intelligence Sources, 54 UMKC L. REV.
332, 332 (1986); Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable After 9/11: A
Proposed Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of Information Act,
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79, 83 (2004); Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments
Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: "A Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
Perhaps Both," 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1192 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Sims, 471 U.S. at 178 (reasoning that "[f]oreign intelligence services have
both the capacity to gather and analyze any information that is in the public domain and the
substantial expertise in deducing the identities of intelligence sources from seemingly
unimportant details").
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The core of mosaic theory-that hostile intelligence agencies can piece
together puzzles from smaller bits of information-can be a legitimate one.
As asserted by the government in FOIA (and, increasingly, state secrets)
cases,8 however, mosaic theory too often is a crude tool that results in
excessive secrecy by demanding extreme deference from judges when
national security is involved. Often, lower courts, concerned with their
own inadequacy to make national security decisions, unquestioningly
accept government assertions regarding the need for complete secrecy.
Sims' acceptance of mosaic theory at the Supreme Court level embraced
this notion of extreme judicial deference and made clear its validity. More
importantly, Sims' approval of mosaic theory reinforced a concomitant
government attitude that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing." Mosaic
theory thus crept into the government's collective consciousness as various
officials and agencies used it to justify other secrecy-based actions in the
name of national security, many of which occurred outside of FOIA.
Several observers criticize the courts' use of mosaic theory in the FOIA
context.9 Given the indiscriminate manner in which the government has
wielded mosaic theory and the courts' refusal to check the government's
actions, such criticism is understandable-particularly when one traces the
use of that theory beyond FOIA. Reining in government abuse of the
mosaic theory, however, need not require disposing of it altogether. Not
8. Because the articles in this forum pertain to the "most underrated administrative law
decision," and because Sims involved FOIA, I chose to focus on mosaic theory as it arose in
the FOIA context. However, mosaic theory was asserted in a lower court case involving the
state secrets litigation privilege prior to its use in FOIA cases. See Halkin v. Helms, 598
F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("It requires little reflection to understand that the business of
foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair."). The
state secrets privilege allows the executive to resist discovery of information in civil
litigation by asserting privilege with respect to state and military secrets that would
adversely affect national security if divulged. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-
7 (1953). Mosaic theory is often invoked when the privilege is asserted. See, e.g., Kasza v.
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp.
2d. 65, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2004); Maxwell v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 143 F.R.D. 590, 597
(D. Md. 1992). Much of the criticism of mosaic theory regarding FOIA applies to the state
secrets privilege. For more discussion on state secrets, see infra notes 102-06.
9. For an excellent, in-depth critique of mosaic theory in the FOIA context, see David
E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act,
115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005). See also Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Government Privilege: A
Cautionary Tale for Codifiers, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 861 (2004); Peter Margulies, Above
Contempt?: Regulating Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 Sw. U. L. REV.
449 (2005); Alice Ristroph & Jameel Jaffer, Security's Province in a Democratic Society, in
DEMOCRACY AND HOMELAND SECURITY: STRATEGIES, CONTROVERSIES, AND IMPACT (Nawal
H. Ammar ed., 2004), available at http://upress.kent.edu/Ammar/05%20Ristroph.Jaffer.htm:
Steven J. Lepper, Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1982, 1983
DUKE L.J. 390 (1983); Jonathan Turley, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National
Security and Statutory Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REV. 205 (2000); Shannon Vibbert,
Comment, A Twisted Mosaic: The Ninth Circuit's Piecemeal Approval of Environmental
Crime in Kasza v. Browner, 17 J. NAT'L RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 95 (2003).
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only does widespread judicial acceptance of the theory suggest that such a
result is infeasible, there are times when mosaic theory may serve
legitimate purposes. Accordingly, our goal should be to focus government
assertions of mosaic theory so that they relate to potential, identifiable
harms and account for possible costs rather than act merely as a convenient
justification to shut down inquiry into the government's case. Such a task
is neither Herculean nor wrongheaded; application of mosaic theory in the
counterintelligence arena itself relies upon adequate threat assessment for
proper functioning. If we begin this task of focusing government assertions
in the FOIA arena, the change ideally will trickle down to other
government behavior as well.
Part I of this Article discusses Sims, its relationship to FOIA, and its
importance to mosaic theory. It concludes with a discussion of the
relationship of mosaic theory and judicial deference. Part II examines the
government's post-Sims use of mosaic theory beyond the FOIA context. It
first examines the Reagan Administration's aggressive use of the theory
with "sensitive but unclassified" technical information and the "Library
Awareness Program," both of which were controversial and eventually
abandoned. Part II then examines the government's post-9/11 assertions of
mosaic theory, many of which mirror the Reagan Administration's ill-fated
attempts. In an effort to effect governmental attitude change more globally,
Part III discusses a more legitimate role for mosaic theory in FOIA cases.
Part III proposes a more nuanced role for mosaic theory that requires
government officials to identify more specifically the harms they seek to
prevent and further proposes mechanisms that force courts into engaging in
meaningful judicial review to ensure that government officials are
accountable for their decisions.
I. CIA v. SIMS, FOIA, AND MOSAIC THEORY
A. CIA v. Sims
Sims involved a FOIA request regarding MKULTRA, a CIA-funded
project involving psychological research, including research on human
subjects. Through the various MKULTRA research projects, contracted
out to 185 researchers at 85 institutions between 1953 and 1966, the CIA
hoped to gain an understanding of brainwashing and interrogation
techniques used by the Chinese and Soviet governments.' 0 The CIA also
hoped that the research might develop chemical and biological methods of
10. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 163 (1985); Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D.D.C.
1979).
[58:4
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obtaining information from foreign intelligence agents."1 Because the CIA
operated MKULTRA through a front organization, most of the institutions
and researchers participating in the experiments were unaware that they
were working at the behest of the CIA.12  Further, while some human
subjects willingly participated in the chemical and biological experiments,
others were unaware that they were part of a government-operated research
project. 13 At some point, the CIA's experimental program became public,
prompting congressional investigation. 14 However, in 1973, prior to those
investigations, the CIA destroyed most of the documents relating to
MKULTRA, and thus these public investigations "depended largely on oral
testimony" to flesh out MKULTRA's parameters.' 5 In 1977, however, the
CIA discovered the existence of certain documents related to the identities
of the researchers and their affiliated institutions, along with other fiscal
and financial records.
16
This newly discovered information prompted individuals associated with
Public Citizen, a public interest group, to file FOIA requests for the
identities of the MKULTRA researchers and their affiliated institutions.
1 7
After consulting with the institutions, the CIA disclosed the names of fifty-
nine institutions that consented to their release, but it did not confer with or
disclose the names of any individual researchers.' 8  The CIA refused to
disclose the remaining information claiming that the researchers and
affiliated institutions were "intelligence sources" within the meaning of the
National Security Act and, therefore, it could withhold the information
pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3.'9
The district court acknowledged that the National Security Act, which
vests the CIA director with responsibility "for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,"2° qualified as an
Exemption 3 statute. However, the court ruled that the CIA did not show
11. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 85; Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Sims I).
12. Sims 1, 642 F.2d at 564.
13. Id.
14. See SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-755, Book I, at 389-409 (1976);
"Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification ": Joint
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence and the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific
Research of the S. Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1-5 (1977); see also
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
226-28 (1975).
15. Sims!, 642 F.2d at 564.
16. Id.
17. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 84. The plaintiffs also requested grant proposals and contracts
for those who performed MKULTRA research, which the CIA turned over without contest.
Id. at 84 n. 1.
18. Id. at 85; Sims I, 642 F.2d at 565.
19. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 85.
20. 50 U.S.C. § 102(d)(3) (2000).
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that the researchers and their affiliated institutions qualified as "intelligence
sources" under the Act. According to the court, the CIA had not
demonstrated particular facts or clear guidelines supporting the
characterization of researchers and institutions as "intelligence sources,"
nor had the CIA provided anything but the broadest definition of the phrase
"intelligence sources. 21  Concerned that the CIA's definition was
"susceptible to discretionary application and overbroad interpretation" that
might conflict with FOIA's emphasis on disclosure, the court ruled
Exemption 3 inapplicable. 22 It held out the possibility, however, that the
CIA could reclassify the identities of the researchers and institutions and
withhold them under FOIA Exemption 1.23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined
that the district court had operated without a sufficient definition of
"intelligence source. ' 24 After reviewing the purposes and text of FOIA, the
National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,25
the Court determined that:
"[i]ntelligence source" is a person or institution that provides, has
provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a
kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively,
yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the
confidentiality of those who provide it.
26
It thus remanded with directions to the lower court to reconsider the
Exemption 3 issue in light of this new definition.
On remand, the district court asked the CIA to submit evidence that the
individuals and institutions withheld were "intelligence sources" within the
new definition. 27  It further suggested that the CIA actually contact
individual researchers to determine their understanding of the nature of
their relationship with the CIA-something the CIA apparently had never
21. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87. The CIA characterized an intelligence source as "any
contributor... to the intelligence process." Id. The CIA admitted that such a definition
was broad enough to apply to "periodicals including Pravda and the New York Times from
which it culls information that informs its view of foreign nations and their policy
intentions." Sims I, 642 F.2d at 569.
22. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87.
23. Id. at 88. FOIA Exemption 1 allows an agency to withhold national security
information that has been properly classified pursuant to executive order. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1). The identities of the researchers and their affiliated institutions were originally
classified, but the CIA had declassified them by the time of the FOIA request so they did not
qualify for Exemption 1 withholding. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 88. The district court also
found wanting the CIA's evidentiary support for its claim that the information could be
withheld under Exemption 6, which protects "personnel and medical files" and similar
information under an invasion of privacy theory. Id. at 88-89.
24. Sims 1, 642 F.2d at 564.
25. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-403j (2000).
26. Sims I, 642 F.2d at 571.
27. Sims v. CIA, 709 F.2d 95, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Sims II).
[58:4
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done.28 After reviewing the evidence, the district court determined that
certain individuals and institutions did not qualify as "intelligence sources"
because they had not actually been promised confidentiality. 9 On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit found that the district court had erred in looking at
"whether the agency had, in fact, promised confidentiality to individual
researchers., 30 Rather, this important issue was governed by an objective
standard: whether the CIA could reasonably expect to obtain the particular
information at issue from sources without pledging them confidentiality. 31
The court of appeals made clear, however, that to qualify as an
"intelligence source," the expectation of confidentiality must come from
the source of information rather than the agency.32 The court of appeals
remanded the case again to the district court for application of the correct
standard regarding the researchers' status.
The CIA appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which ruled in the
agency's favor, finding that the identities of researchers and institutions
were exempt under FOIA. 33 The Court first noted that the lower court's
definition of "intelligence sources" under the National Security Act "not
only contravene[d] the express intention of Congress, but also overlook[ed]
the practical necessities of modern intelligence gathering., 34 According to
the Court, both the text and legislative history of the Act reflected a clear
congressional intent that the CIA would call on a wide variety of
intelligence sources and that the CIA was to protect those sources,
regardless of the need to guarantee confidentiality. 35 Consequently, the
Supreme Court held that the MKULTRA researchers were "intelligence
sources" because they "provided, or were engaged to provide, information
the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations with respect to foreign
intelligence," regardless of any promises of secrecy made to the
researchers.36 As scholars have noted, this aspect of the Court's decision
28. Id. The district court repeatedly suggested that the CIA contact individual
researchers and also intimated that such an action might establish a common law or
constitutional right to protection of their anonymity. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 85. The CIA
never presented evidence "that researchers and institutions in this case were given promises
of confidentiality" and instead chose to rely on Exemption 3 to withhold the information.
Id.
29. Sims H, 709 F.2d at 98.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 100.
32. Id.
33. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 181 (1985).
34. Id. at 168-69.
35. Id. at 169-73.
36. Id. at 173-74.
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gave the CIA nearly unfettered discretion to determine who an intelligence
source is and grants the agency a nearly wholesale exemption from FOIA
scrutiny.
37
The Court's reasoning with respect to whether the researchers'
institutional affiliations were exempt under FOIA, however, had even
broader implications. As with the identity of the researchers, the Court
found the affiliation information exempt under FOIA. In fact, the answer
was so closely linked to the issue of individual researchers that it
"render[ed] unnecessary any extended discussion of this discrete issue.
Given that close relationship and the CIA's broad discretion under the
National Security Act, the most logical step would have been to allow
withholding of affiliation information to protect the identities of individual
researchers.39 Instead, the Sims Court relied on mosaic theory.
According to the Court,
Foreign intelligence services have an interest in knowing what is being
studied and researched by our agencies dealing with national security
and by whom it is being done. Foreign intelligence services have both
the capacity to gather and analyze any information that is in the public
domain and the substantial expertise in deducing the identities of
intelligence sources from seemingly unimportant details.
In this context, the very nature of the intelligence apparatus of any
country is to try to find out the concerns of others; bits and pieces of data
"may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the
individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself." Thus
"'[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the
questioned item of information in its proper context."'
..The decisions of the [CIA, which] must of course be familiar with
"the whole picture," as judges are not, are worthy of great deference
given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks
at stake. It is conceivable that the mere explanation of why information
must be withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign
intelligence agency.40
Although the CIA had identified many institutions during the FOIA
litigation or earlier congressional investigations, the Court allowed CIA
officials to withhold identification of other institutions. Selective
revelation of information, the Court reasoned, was part of the intelligence
37. See sources cited supra note 6.
38. Sims, 471 U.S. at 178.
39. See id. at 179 (noting the lower court's reasoning that the CIA need not disclose
affiliations of exempt researchers because disclosure might lead to indirect identification of
individual researchers).
40. Id. at 178-79 (quoting Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and
Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (internal citations omitted).
[58:4
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game, and the Court would not question the CIA's decision "to weigh the
variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether disclosure of
information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the
Agency's intelligence-gathering process.'
By adopting mosaic theory, Sims did more than give the CIA broad
discretion when determining who an intelligence source is. Rather, Sims
embraced a theory that allowed the government to broaden considerably
the universe of information considered to be dangerous if disclosed and
adopted notions of judicial incompetence with respect to national security
determinations. Furthermore, Sims' ruling was not limited to the
identification of intelligence sources under the National Security Act.
Rather, its reasoning can be applied whenever the government seeks to
withhold information relying on a national security rationale-for example,
under Exemption 1.
B. Mosaic Theory, Government Secrecy, FOIA, and Judicial Deference
Mosaic theory has long been associated with the intelligence gathering
process. As one observer noted:
[The modem] business of foreign intelligence ... is more akin to the
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and
dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous
information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling
clarity how the unseen whole must operate.
Thus, mosaic theory is a theory of informational synergy in which
intelligence agencies convert independently innocuous information into
potentially significant intelligence information.43 For national security
purposes, United States intelligence agencies find construction of such
mosaics particularly useful as they attempt to discover what others are
doing. What can be done by United States intelligence agencies, however,
can be done by hostile intelligence agencies. Thus, our government also
sees mosaic theory as a justification for government secrecy.
Under FOIA, however, government officials may withhold requested
information only if it falls within a specific exemption. For national
security purposes, agencies generally rely on Exemption 3, if there exists a
statute specifically authorizing withholding such as in Sims, or on
Exemption 1, which applies to classified national security information. 44 If
the requested information does not credibly fall within the terms of an
exemption, the government should disclose it. In response to FOIA
41. Sims, 471 U.S. at 180-81.
42. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 8.
43. See Pozen, supra note 9, at 630.
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 58 Admin. L. Rev. 853 2006
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
requests involving national security, government officials find mosaic
theory particularly useful because it allows them to argue that information
not evidently posing a threat to national security should nevertheless be
considered appropriately classified or exempt. Their reasoning is that
otherwise apparently innocuous information can be pieced together with
other information to form part of a larger, more dangerous picture. Thus,
the information, though admittedly innocuous in isolation, could prove to
be dangerous and must be withheld. Accordingly, mosaic theory is an
attempt to expand the government's ability to withhold information under
existing law.
Even so, the assertion that an item of information poses a potential
danger and thus must remain secret need not go wholly unreviewed. FOIA
requires that judges faced with FOIA lawsuits review the government's
claim of exemption de novo.45 Thus, judges are justified in demanding that
the government connect the dots between the apparently innocuous piece of
information withheld and the larger, more dangerous picture to which it is
allegedly connected. In Sims, however, the CIA preempted such demands
by asserting that only it was "familiar with 'the whole picture' as judges
[were] not" and that "mere explanation of why information must be
withheld [could] convey valuable information to a foreign intelligence
agency.,46 Accordingly, agency officials argue, judges must defer to the
agency's superior information and skill.
Invocation of mosaic theory thus creates a vacuum of knowledge that
effectively paralyzes judicial assessment of the government's claims. All
mosaic theory claims by their very nature are speculative regarding
possible harms. Typically, speculative claims and lack of information
weigh against the government. Mosaic theory turns this lack of
information and speculation to the government's advantage by explicitly
casting the judge as an outsider, ill-suited to understanding the bigger
picture. It also uses the judge's lack of expertise as a reason to refuse to
provide information that might educate the judge (on the never-quite-
spoken assumption that it would be mishandled), thus further hampering
judicial resolution of disputes.
In addition, mosaic theory raises the specter of hostile intelligence
agencies lying in wait (as one court put it, like "zealous ferrets") 47 for the
opportunity to wreak havoc with that one, seemingly innocent piece of
judicially released information. Psychological research shows that such
visions of potentially catastrophic events play on extremely vivid fears,
causing people to react to them regardless of an assessment of the actual
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
46. Sims, 471 U.S. at 179.
47. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
[58:4
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risk.48 Invocation of a possibly serious threat to national security would
tend to cause judges to defer to agency claims, especially given the absence
of information and the lack of adequate guideposts for judicial review.49 In
fact, the presence of so many variables in mosaic theory-a hostile
intelligence agency that might be lurking about (or not), a potentially
dangerous result (or not), a bigger picture that could be constructed (or not)
with this innocuous (or not) piece of the puzzle-leads to extreme judicial
deference.5°
Even absent the invocation of mosaic theory, judges have never shown a
strong desire to scrutinize overly careful government withholdings relying
on a national security rationale.51 But FOIA contemplates that judges have
a role in reviewing FOIA disputes involving national security, especially
after Congress amended the Act in response to EPA v. Mink.52 A court that
48. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 220 (Ragnar E.
L6fstedt ed., 2000).
49. For an argument regarding government use of "catastrophic" fears designed to
cause judicial deference in a slightly different context involving national security, see
Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 115.
50. Pozen, supra note 9, at 641 (noting that mosaic theory presents the courts with a
reason "to fear disclosure and mistrust their own judgment").
51. See Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of
Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1207-08 (2004) (discussing uneven application of
the de novo review standard to national security cases under FOIA Exemption 1); see also
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17.4.1, at 661-62 (2d
ed. 2001) (noting the deference with which judges review FOIA national security exemption
claims); I JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 11.26, at 539-41 (3d
ed. 2000) (explaining that "[d]eference by courts to classification exceptions is the norm"
and that "an agency claim of damage to national security from release of intelligence
sources and methods would be deferentially accepted by many courts"). In the FOIA
Exemption 1 context, for example, although courts acknowledge FOIA's requirement of de
novo review, they also pay heed to Congress's admonition that "in making de novo
determinations... [courts] will accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record." H.R. REP. No. 93-
1200, at 12 (1974). Many courts rely on this language to grant summary judgment for the
government as long as the government's arguments are logical and plausible and its
affidavits are reasonably detailed, indicate good faith, and conform to existing classification
requirements. See, e.g., Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (deferring to
the counterintelligence expertise of the CIA and noting that "government affidavits
regarding harm that disclosure could cause to national security [are] entitled to 'substantial
weight'); Abbotts v. NRC, 766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing the same language
from the House report and granting summary judgment to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission based on the Commission's affidavits); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying the standard cited in the House Report and approving the CIA's
non-disclosure of information).
52. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). In Mink, the Supreme Court interpreted an earlier version of
FOIA Exemption I as allowing judges only to review the procedural propriety of an
official's decision to classify material in the name of national security and not whether the
classification was substantively proper under the Executive Order. Id. at 82. Congress
amended FOIA to reflect the current requirement that information is exempt only if it is
"specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy and ... [is] in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive order." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Congress intended to overrule
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fully embraces the government's version of mosaic theory, however, is
unlikely ever to question seriously the government's assertions or require
the government to justify its refusal to disclose information. The theory is
designed to short-circuit such questioning.
Sims was not the first case to endorse mosaic theory-it relied on a
trilogy of lower court cases that popularized the theory.53 But its
willingness to embrace mosaic theory had significant implications. Sims
gave the Supreme Court's imprimatur to what was merely a theory in the
lower courts, removing any doubt about its vitality. Furthermore, although
Sims' discussion of mosaic theory involved the CIA's FOIA obligations
under the National Security Act, Sims did not limit the theory to that
context and, indeed, mosaic theory-and attendant notions of judicial
deference-have spread to any FOIA dispute involving national security.54
Finally, Sims' unquestioning acceptance of mosaic theory must have
solidified the government's attitude toward its obligation to disclose
information-that is, Sims' extreme deference to the CIA's assertions
reinforced the government's attitude that it need not disclose information or
justify its decisions. The next section discusses this attitude and the
concomitant spread of mosaic theory beyond the FOIA context.
55
II. MOSAIC THEORY BEYOND FOIA
A. The Reagan/Bush I Years
1. National Security Decision Directive 145
In the final decade of the Cold War, the Reagan Administration became
increasingly concerned about Soviet espionage regarding scientific and
Mink and broaden judicial review in this area. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 7-8 (1974)
(citing two proposed amendments to FOIA that aim to increase judicial authority to "engage
in a full review of agency action with respect to information classified by the Department of
Defense and other agencies under Executive authority"). Similarly, FOIA gives courts
discretion to exercise in camera review of documents or require segregation and release of
all non-exempt portions of documents. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
53. See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (taking into account that
"each individual piece of intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may
aid in piecing together other bits of intelligence information even when the individual piece
is not of obvious importance in itself'); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(analogizing "the business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer
technology" to the "construction of a mosaic"); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309,
1318 (4th Cir. 1972) ("What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene .... ").
54. For a discussion of judges' deferential application of mosaic theory in cases
involving national security, see Pozen, supra note 9, at 643-45.
55. Whether the spread of mosaic theory resulted from Sims or simply happened at
relatively the same time is likely unknowable. However, it is reasonable to assume that the
Court's extremely deferential approach to mosaic theory at least reinforced the
government's attitude toward using it.
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technical data. Consequently, it pursued a variety of tactics designed to
protect information from potential spies.56 President Reagan issued a new
Executive Order broadening the federal government's ability to keep
national security information secret.57 Among other things, the Reagan
order explicitly adopted mosaic theory as a basis for classifying
information, thus writing into law what courts had earlier accepted as
justification for withholding information. 58
In 1984, recognizing that new telecommunications and computer
technologies increased vulnerabilities, President Reagan also issued
National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD 145). NSDD 145
directed that those in possession of "sensitive but unclassified" government
information-the "loss of which could adversely affect the national
security interest"-should protect it "in proportion to the threat of
exploitation and the associated potential damage to the national security. 59
It also vested control of computer security in the Department of Defense
and the National Security Administration (NSA). 60  As time passed, it
became clear that Reagan Administration officials intended to treat NSDD
145 as a means of withholding information. 61 The Reagan Administration's
56. Janet Raloff, Coming: The Big Chill?, in FREEDOM AT RISK 86 (Richard 0. Curry
ed., 1988).
57. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982). For commentary on the Reagan
order, see Harold C. Relyea, Historical Development of Federal Information Policy, in
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INFORMATION POLICIES 25, 40 (Charles R. McClure et al. eds.,
1989) (remarking that Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,356 reversed a thirty-year trend of
narrowing classification criteria).
58. Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 169 ("Information that is determined
to concern one or more of the [classification] categories ... shall be classified when [it is
determined] ... that its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other
information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.").
President Clinton abandoned the Reagan Administration's expansive use of mosaic theory
as a basis for classification in favor of a more restrictive and contextual use of the theory.
For discussion, see Pozen, supra note 9, at 645.
59. National Security Decision Directive 145: National Policy on Telecommunications
and Automated Information Systems Security 2b (1984), available at http:// www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/nsdd145.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). For a historical discussion of NSDD
145, see Genevieve J. Knezo, "Sensitive But Unclassified" and Other Federal Security
Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current Controversy 10-12
(2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31845.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
60. H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 2, at 13, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3165; HAROLD
C. RELYEA, SILENCING SCIENCE: NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS AND SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNICATION 160 (1994).
61. A 1986 policy statement issued by then-National Security Advisor John Poindexter
stated that "[slensitive, but unclassified information is information the disclosure, loss,
misuse, alteration, or destruction of which could adversely affect national security."
National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, but Unclassified Information in Federal
Government Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems, NTISSP No. 2
(1986), reprinted in Office of Technology Assessment, Defending Secrets, Sharing Data:
New Locks and Keys for Electronic Information, OTA-CIT-310 (1987), available at
www.blackvault.com/documents/ota/ota-3DATA/1987/8706.PDF at App. B (emphasis
added). See also H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 2, at 14-15, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3166-67 (declaring that NTISSP No. 2 expanded government control over a "wide spectrum
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justification for this extension of authority sounded in mosaic theory:
"[I]nformation, even if unclassified in isolation, often can reveal highly
classified and other sensitive information when taken in aggregate. 62
In 1986, NSDD 145 found its way beyond government information.
Relying on a provision exhorting government officials to encourage and
assist the private sector regarding sensitive but unclassified information,63
officials from the FBI, Department of Defense, NSA, and CIA visited
private database vendors to discuss the Reagan Administration's continuing
concern that hostile intelligence agents might piece together government
secrets from publicly available information.64 Government officials visited
companies-such as Mead Data Central (owner of LEXIS/NEXIS),
Lockheed Corporation (owner of DIALOG), Compuserve, and various
banks-and asked them to consider restricting the sale of sensitive but
unclassified information to Eastern Bloc countries or to monitor requests so
that the government surreptitiously could identify those requesting
potentially sensitive information. 65 Government officials were concerned
that, while a single newspaper article might prove innocuous, when
coupled with the material available in an entire database, "the sum might
turn out to be more dangerous-and therefore more in need of controls-
than the individual pieces. 66
This move significantly expanded mosaic theory. Not only did the
government use it outside the context of Executive Order classification, it
attempted to control material in the hands of non-governmental parties.6 7
Not surprisingly, these actions were controversial. The Information
Industry Association, an organization representing private data companies,
protested the government's requests for "voluntary compliance, 68 with its
of scientific, economic and cultural information"); David Banisar, Stopping Science: The
Case of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 253, 259-60 (1999) (claiming that the Reagan
Administration used NSDD 145 and NTISSP No. 2 directives to expand government control
over a larger scope of information than was previously allowed).
62. National Security Decision Directive 145, supra note 59; see also Banisar, supra
note 61, at 259 ("[NSDD 145] was based on the assumption that aggregating unclassified
information could affect national security and, therefore, those systems should be controlled
by the military.").
63. National Security Decision Directive 145, supra note 59, at 2c.
64. H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 2, at 7, 14, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3159,
3167; Raloff, supra note 56, at 89; Banisar, supra note 61, at 260.
65. Raloff, supra note 56, at 89; Banisar, supra note 61, at 260; H.R. REP. No. 100-235,
pt. 2, at 7, 14, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3159, 3167
66. Raloff, supra note 56, at 89; see also HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE
STACKS: THE FBI's LIBRARY AWARENESS PROGRAM 72 (1991) (citing the government's
concern that publicly available information, "once aggregated ... could be used against
national interests") (internal citation omitted).
67. Raloff, supra note 56, at 90.
68. While the government asked for voluntary compliance, it apparently was willing to
back its requests with coercion, including limiting the availability of government resources
for those refusing to help, threatening export control prosecutions for failure to limit access
to data, and limiting access to government information for refusing to comply. H.R. REP.
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program, arguing that the Reagan Administration's "restrictions on the
flow of unclassified information could severely limit the information
available to citizens, have a chilling effect on those who wish to acquire
information, restrict our nation's technological development, and hinder the
ability of U.S. companies to do business. 69
At congressional hearings, others expressed similar concerns. Many
were concerned that the restrictions on sensitive but unclassified
information threatened industrial and scientific endeavors.70  They also
were bothered by the vague and amorphous definition of sensitive but
unclassified information, a problem especially highlighted after a second
Reagan Administration directive expanded the term to include a variety of
economic, financial, industrial, agricultural, or technological information
that might relate to the national defense or foreign relations.71 Others
expressed concern about military involvement in civilian activities,
especially in light of the federal government's surveillance abuses of the
1960s and 1970s.72 Eventually, the Reagan Administration reconsidered
the need for NSDD 145. 73
No. 100-235, pt. 2, at 15-16, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3167-68.
69. Raloff, supra note 56, at 90 (quoting Paul G. Zurkowski, President, Information
Industry Association).
70. H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 2, at 16-18, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3168-70.
71. See NTISSP No. 2 (Oct. 29, 1986), reprinted in Defending Secrets, supra note 61, at
App. B (expanding the realm of classifiable information to include government interests
related, but not limited to, the "wide range of government or government-derived economic,
human, financial, industrial, agricultural, technological, and law enforcement
information... "); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 2, at 14-15, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3166-67 (commenting on the same directive and remarking that it
expanded the Department of Defense's control over a wide spectrum of information).
72. H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 1, at 19, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3134 (citing
several experts' concerns that NSDD 145 would impinge upon civil liberties and the free
flow of information vital to scientific and economic development); H.R. REP. No. 100-235,
pt. 2, at 16-17, 19-31, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3168-69, 3171-83 (noting that
NSDD 145 would "strangle the free flow of information in this country-all in the name of
national security" and echoing similar concerns of organizations such as the ACLU, Aetna
Life and Casualty Company, the American Banking Association, and the American Physical
Society).
73. Raloff, supra note 56, at 91. The Reagan Administration also rescinded NTISSP
No. 2. Id. This may have occurred because Congress passed the Computer Security Act of
1987, which vested in the National Bureau of Standards the power to establish uniform
security standards for government computers and made clear that the Act did not convey the
authority to limit information in the hands of private entities. Computer Security Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724-30 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3) (specifying
that "[niothing in amendment by Pub. L. 100-235 which enacted this section to be construed
to constitute authority to . . . authorize any Federal agency to limit, restrict, regulate, or
control collection, maintenance, disclosure, use, transfer, or sale of any information that is
privately owned information... ").
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2. The Library Awareness Program
In 1985, also due to concern regarding Soviet acquisition of technical
information, the FBI attempted to instigate a counterintelligence program
in libraries designed to keep information out of Soviet hands (the Library
Awareness Program).74 According to the FBI, Soviet agents were engaged
in ongoing efforts to collect unclassified, technical information from
libraries, including the Library of Congress, specialized departments of
university libraries, and large information clearinghouses.75 FBI concerns
ranged from Soviet intelligence officers posing as diplomatic officials
while searching intelligence databases to Soviet attempts to enlist students
and librarians to do research and potentially spy on their behalf
7 6
As a result, the FBI visited libraries, focusing primarily on those in the
New York City area.7 FBI agents explained to librarians that they "were
often targets of intelligence officers who seek 'unclassified, publicly
available information relating more often than not to science and technical
matters.' ' '78 Accordingly, the FBI attempted to enlist the librarians' aid to
protect against technology transfer and to engage in counter-surveillance
for the FBI by reporting suspicious or unusual activity of foreigners.79
74. The FBI had been concerned with such Soviet activities since the 1960s but the
organized counterintelligence program ran from 1973-1976 and began again in 1985, around
the time Sims was decided. FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 14.
75. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE KGB AND THE LIBRARY TARGET, 1962-
PRESENT 4-5, 30-31 (1988) [hereinafter THE KGB AND THE LIBRARY TARGET].
76. See Ulrika Ekman Ault, Note, The FBI's Library Awareness Program: Is Big
Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1534-38 (1990).
77. See generally THE KGB AND LIBRARY TARGET, supra note 75 (indicating that the
Scientific and Research Branch of the KGB was headquartered in New York City, KGB
agents actively sought information in New York City libraries, and that the FBI sent agents
to interview librarians in New York City to learn about these KGB visits). When the
program initially was revealed, the FBI claimed that it was limited to New York City, but it
appears that the FBI also pursued it elsewhere, although the extent of the program was never
clear. FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 51-71.
78. FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 55, 79 (quoting Memorandum from FBI New York
Office to FBI Headquarters (Sept. 21, 1987)); see also FBI Counterintelligence Visits to
Libraries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 77-78 (1988) [hereinafter FBI Counterintelligence
Visits to Libraries] (testimony of Paula T. Kaufman, Acting Vice President for Information
Services and University Librarian, Columbia University) (noting that the FBI "explained
that libraries such as ours were often used by KGB and other intelligence agents for
recruiting activities").
79. The FBI initially denied that the Library Awareness Program was designed to do
anything other than educate libraries regarding their role as potential targets. Ault, supra
note 76, at 1535-38. However, later documents and testimony belie this characterization.
The FBI's own publication indicates that it desired to enlist the aid of librarians in
identifying possible Soviet activity regarding sensitive information. THE KGB AND THE
LIBRARY TARGET, supra note 75, at 33. Similarly, reports from librarians indicate that the
FBI requested that they monitor patron activity for suspicious behavior. FBI
Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries, supra note 78, at 75, 81-82 (testimony of Paula
Kaufman); FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 56 (citing Interview with Nancy Gubman, librarian
at NYU's Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences Library).
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When faced with the libraries' responses that the material in their
collections was unmonitored and freely available precisely because it was
unclassified, the FBI countered with mosaic theory. At Columbia
University, for example, the FBI explained that "singular information may
be of little value, however, a compilation of these materials often assist
[sic] these countries in their research programs. 80 Similarly, in describing
the situation to librarians at NYU, the agents explained that "though the
materials were unclassified, some items might be 'more sensitive than
general library materials,' particularly when organized through data-base
searches." 81 In general, mosaic theory provided the framework for the
entire FBI program.
82
Librarians, much of Congress, and the public responded negatively to the
Library Awareness Program. Librarians objected to acting as
counterintelligence agents, especially given that the FBI asked them to
watch and report on patrons based on vague standards, such as whether
someone was "acting against the security of the United States,, 83 sounded
foreign, or had a foreign sounding name. 84 As one observer noted,
To comply with the requests the FBI makes of libraries-to identify
Soviet agents or suspicious activity by persons that may be cooperating
with Soviet agents-would require library staff to ascribe motives to the
use of library resources and then report their judgments to the FBI. In
effect, the FBI is asking librarians to police the use of libraries. [We]
reject[] this information policing role, because the assignment cannot be
undertaken without impinging on citizens' rights to privacy.
8 5
Others argued that such surveillance would inhibit the free exchange of
ideas and "seriously and unnecessarily invade the intellectual life of
,,86
citizens '. Still others noted that the Library Awareness Program was a
80. FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 55; see also FBI Counterintelligence Visits to
Libraries, supra note 78, at 32 (statement of C. James Schmidt, Executive Vice President,
Research Libraries Group, Inc.) (referring to government's argument that access to
unclassified information should be limited because "we are threatened by an 'information
mosaic,' composed of separate bits of unclassified data such that the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts.").
81. FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 56 (quoting the author's interview with Nancy
Gubman, librarian at NYU's Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences Library).
82. See THE KGB AND LIBRARY TARGET, supra note 75, at 32-33 (noting the FBI's
need to piece together Soviet intelligence efforts by pursuing all contacts between possible
Soviet agents and Americans, including librarians).
83. FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 59.
84. FBI Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries, supra note 78, at 75-76 (testimony of
Paula Kaufman); Ault, supra note 76, at 1535 n. 15.
85. FBI Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries, supra note 78, at 13 (statement of
Duane E. Webster, Executive Director of Association of Research Libraries).
86. Id. at 24 (testimony of C. James Schmidt of the American Library Association).
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thinly veiled government effort to control the dissemination of non-
classified information in much the same vein as NSDD 145.87 Finally,
some critics noted that the FBI's request potentially violated state
confidentiality laws.88
Not content to leave privacy issues in the hands of state laws, members
of Congress proposed legislation to protect the confidentiality of library
circulation records. The proposed law would have prevented librarians
from disclosing to law enforcement officials records related to library use
unless there existed a court order (obtained after an opportunity for a full
hearing) based upon "clear and convincing evidence" finding that the
subject of the order was involved in criminal activity and the information
sought was "highly probative." 89 The FBI, however, sought to amend the
law so that it could obtain patrons' library records simply by using a
"national security letter" (NSL), a form of administrative subpoena that
allows the government to access records on a much lower showing than
court orders require.90 As a result of the FBI's lobbying efforts, and to
avoid the insertion of an NSL provision, proponents of the bill eventually
abandoned it. 9' The Library Awareness Program also fell into disuse as a
result of the public controversy surrounding it, although the FBI refused to
abandon it altogether.
92
87. Representative Don Edwards, who opposed the program, noted that the "library
visits were tied to the troubling, though sometimes fitful, government effort to control
unclassified information." Don Edwards, Government Information Controls Threaten
Academic Freedom, THOUGHT & ACTION: THE NEA HIGHER EDUC. J., Spring 1989, at 89.
See also FBI Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries, supra note 78, at 13-14 (statement of
Duane E. Webster) (reporting that the FBI attempted to gain access to private databases,
linking the FBI's library program and NSDD 145).
88. See Ault, supra note 76, at 1549 ("Librarians have reported attempts by the FBI to
force disclosures expressly prohibited by state confidentiality laws.").
89. See Video and Library Privacy Protection Act of 1988: J Hearing on H.R. 4947
and S. 2361 Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 5-6, 14 (1989) (statement of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier,
Chairman, Subcomm. On Cts., Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice) (proposing also
that the law enforcement officials must show that less intrusive attempts to gain the
information have failed and that the "value of information" sought prevails over privacy
interests).
90. See id. at 146-47 (letter from Reps. Don Edwards and Robert Kastenmeier to Rep.
Louis Stokes) (discussing proposed national security letter (NSL) amendment and criticizing
the FBI's lobbying efforts); see also infra notes 91, 133 and accompanying text.
91. See FOERSTEL, supra note 66, at 132-33 (describing withdrawal of library bill after
the FBI's legislative liaison approached Congress attempting to gain an exemption).
92. See id. at 74-76 (relating the FBI's attempts to assure the public that the program
was still in use, while privately "back[ing] off' from using it).
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B. Post 9/11 Use of Mosaic Theory
1. Mosaic Theory in the Courts
Other than in the FOIA and state secrets contexts, use of mosaic theory
receded after the Reagan and Bush I Administrations, a phenomenon
consistent with the Clinton Administration's more generous attitude toward
FOIA and government openness.93 Since 9/11, however, the Bush II
Administration has invoked mosaic theory to justify numerous actions.
Some of its most aggressive invocations involve FOIA.94  In Center for
National Security Studies v. Department of Justice, the government relied
on mosaic theory to justify withholding the identification of certain people
detained in the initial aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, as well as other
information relating to their arrests and detentions (such as date and
location of arrest or release).95 Thus, the government argued that release of
detainee information might interfere with law enforcement proceedings by
allowing terrorists to map the course of the investigation and develop the
means to impede it.96 Similarly, in ACLU v. Department of Justice, the
government relied on mosaic theory to justify withholding summary
statistics about the enforcement of certain provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act, such as the number of times that certain kinds of
intelligence-related subpoenas were issued.9 7 The government again
argued that release of such statistics, when coupled with other information
in the public domain, might allow terrorists to map the FBI's investigative
efforts. 98
In both cases, courts ultimately allowed the government to withhold
information based on mosaic theory, although not everyone agreed. The
district court in Center for National Security Studies originally ruled
mosaic theory inapplicable to some of the information.9 9 The appellate
93. See Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United
States: Beyond the Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT:
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33, 52-54 (2003), available at www.maxwell.syr.edu/
campbell/Past%20Events/Papers/NSOG.pdf. (examining President Clinton's directives
mandating openness).
94. At least one critic has noted that "the withholdings validated in the recent [post 9/11
mosaic theory] cases have been more speculative, more categorical, and more controversial
than the withholdings validated before the attacks." Pozen, supra note 9, at 653-54.
95. See 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2002), affd in part and rev'd in part, 331 F.3d
918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
96. See id.
97. See 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D.D.C. 2004).
98. See id. at 37 (arguing that disclosure would inform terrorist organizations of the
FBI's investigative techniques).
99. See Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 103-04 (finding that the
defendants improperly relied upon mosaic theory because "there is simply no existing
precedent" and applying it would "turn 7A into an exemption dragnet").
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court reversed that ruling over the objection of Judge David Tatel, who
accused his colleagues of "drastically diminish[ing], if not eliminat[ing],
the judiciary's role in FOIA cases that implicate national-security interests"
based upon conclusory government affidavits and their own speculation.'
00
Even the ACLU v. Department of Justice court noted that the government's
reliance on mosaic theory "may cast too wide a net," although it upheld the
Exemption I claim after citing to Sims)'0
The Bush Administration increasingly invokes mosaic theory in state
secrets situations as well. In litigation involving the wrongful termination
of an FBI whistleblower,10 2 secret renditions of potential terrorists to other
countries,' °3 and the NSA surveillance schemes, 04 the government has
relied on mosaic theory in its assertion of the state secrets privilege.
Already a controversial privilege because of courts' extreme deference in
such cases,0 5 the government's use of mosaic theory with that privilege
evidences the Bush Administration's aggressive stance with respect to
secrecy regarding government information. The results are significant. As
a recent article noted, "the impossibility and mosaic theories, coupled with
the courts' demonstrated reluctance to even conduct in camera inspections
of material before affirming secrecy, mean that an administrator's decision
to withhold information by assertion of the state secrets privilege is
virtually unreviewable."'1
0 6
100. ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
101. See ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38 (yielding to the court's
reliance on Sims, 471 U.S. at 178 in Ctrfor Nat 7 Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928).
102. See Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd,
161 Fed. Appx. 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (arguing that the Court must defer to the government's
expertise, especially when national security is at risk).
103. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9,
EI-Masri v. Tenet, No. 1:05-cv-01417-TSE-TRJ (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2006), available at
www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/govt mot -dismiss.pdf (employing a "deferential standard of
review" to suggest that the evidence supported the Director's claim of privilege).
104. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 985-86 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (setting
forth the government's assertions regarding the need to dismiss plaintiffs' lawsuit);
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 12, ACLU
v. NSA, No. 2:06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2006), www.cryptome.quintessenz.at/
mirror/aclu-34.pdf (arguing that "the privilege is absolute" and the court should not weigh
the needs of the parties).
105. See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power,
120 POL. Sci. Q. 85, 86-87 (2005) (noting that in most cases in which the state secrets
privilege is employed against citizens' constitutional claims, the privilege is upheld).
Weaver and Pallitto note that courts denied executive assertions of state secrets privilege in
only four of the fifty-six reported cases decided from United States v. Reynolds until 2001.
Id. at 101-02. See also Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the
National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 571 (1982) (suggesting
that the manner in which state secret privilege has been used "seriously burdens discovery
rights").
106. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 105, at 108. The "impossibility" theory involves a
government assertion that the evidence sought is so critical to a plaintiff's case that it cannot
proceed absent the evidence. Successful invocation of the privilege requires dismissal of the
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Mosaic theory also appears in government litigation unrelated to FO1A
or state secrets. In September 2001, the Bush Administration closed to the
public all "special interest" deportation proceedings involving people
potentially related to the 9/11 attacks.10 7 In two separate cases, Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft' 8 and North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft,10 9 media groups challenged the blanket closure, claiming that it
violated the First Amendment's guarantee of press access to legal
proceedings." 0 In both cases, the Bush Administration justified the blanket
closure by arguing that "the importance of protecting against disclosure of
information is not limited to obviously sensitive information. Even bits and
pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation can fit into a
bigger picture by terrorist groups in order to thwart the Government's
efforts to investigate and prevent terrorism."'''
Although the cases proceeded on nearly identical legal and evidentiary
lines, the Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group courts
ultimately split on the closure issue. The evidence supporting the
government's assertion of mosaic theory involved conclusory affidavits
from agency officials-also liberally sprinkled with mosaic theory
rhetoric-alleging that open hearings would: (1) reveal sources and
methods of investigation, (2) provide information allowing terrorists to
exploit the immigration system, (3) provide terrorists with the state of the
FBI's investigations and knowledge about terrorists, (4) allow terrorists to
interfere by causing misleading evidence to be used, and (5) stigmatize
those who eventually turn out to be unrelated to terrorism." 2 According to
case. See, e.g., Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (E.D. Va. 2000). Government
officials increasingly assert the privilege to avoid lawsuits rather than immunize particular
information from discovery. See Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More
Popular Legal Tactic By U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at 32 (describing recent cases
where the privilege was used to dismiss cases rather than protect certain documents).
107. See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (D.N.J.
2002) (discussing memorandum closing hearings issued by Chief United States Immigration
Judge Michael Creppy), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198, 218 (3d Cir. 2002).
108. 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich.), af'd, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
109. 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
110. See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 940; North Jersey Media Group, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 290. Plaintiffs relied on Supreme Court cases allowing press access to certain
court hearings. See generally Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Ca., 478 U.S. 1, 10(1986) (holding that preliminary hearings are included in the First Amendment right of
access); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (determining
that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment").
11. Brief for Appellants at 47, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-1437) (internal quotation marks omitted); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F. 3d 198, 218 (3d Cir. 2002).
112. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 218-19 (summarizing the Declaration
of Dale L. Watson). The government relied on a similar affidavit in Detroit Free Press. See
Declaration of Dale L. Watson, Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice at 4-5, 195 F. Supp. 2d
937 (E.D. Mich. 2002), No. 02-70339, available at http://www.cnss.org/watsonaffidavit.pdf
(discussing the rationale underlying his belief that opening the detention hearings would
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the North Jersey Media Group court, these arguments, though speculative,
were credible and unrebutted. Moreover, the case involved national
security, an area in which the court was loathe to second-guess the
government, even with civil liberties at stake. 1 3 In contrast, the Detroit
Free Press court rejected the government's invocation of mosaic theory.
Although the court acknowledged that "the risk of 'mosaic intelligence'
may exist," it found that the government's belief that all detainees might
potentially disclose information leading terrorists to impede government
investigations was unsupported by evidence and speculative at best.'4 The
Court further feared that the mosaic theory argument was limitless, as the
mere assertion of "national security" as a rationale allowed the government
to "operate in virtual secrecy" by "clos[ing] any public hearing completely
and categorically, including criminal proceedings."' 5
The Bush Administration also relied on mosaic theory to defend the
indefinite detention of non-citizens rounded up in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks. In Fall 2001 hearings seeking release of detainees-most of whom
were later found to have no connection to terrorism-the FBI argued for
their continued detention because "the business of counterterrorism
intelligence gathering ... is akin to the construction of a mosaic" which
requires the "gathering and processing [of] thousands of bits and pieces of
information that may seem innocuous at first glance."' 1 6 Essentially, the
FBI argued that continued detention was necessary because the detainees
might later be found to have information relevant to a terrorist
investigation. 117 The government made a similar mosaic theory argument
in response to a more recent class action lawsuit challenging the indefinite
detentions.t'8
compromise the investigation). In North Jersey Media Group, the government also
provided an affidavit from James S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, making essentially the same
statements. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705-06.
113. See North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219 (refusing to "conduct a judicial
inquiry.., as national security is an area where courts have traditionally extended great
deference to Executive expertise").
114. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707, 709.
115. Id.at 709-10.
116. See Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption; Massive, Secretive
Detention Effort Aimed Mainly at Preventing More Terror, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at
AOl (quoting affidavit of FBI official).
117. See Nancy V. Baker, National Security Versus Civil Liberties, 33 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 547, 554 (2003) (discussing an FBI affidavit arguing that even those with "minor
violations" should be detained).
118. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Partial Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of the
United States and Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendants John Ashcroft, Robert
Mueller, James W. Ziglar, Dennis Hasty, and Michael Zink, Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02
CV 2307 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004), available at www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
september I Ith/docs/Defs' Brief_%20_OmnibusMotion toDismissl130041.pdf. The
defendants' motion did not explicitly mention mosaic theory. See id. Rather, it argued for
court deference to the government's detention of plaintiffs because national security was
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2. Mosaic Theory Outside of the Courts
a. Sensitive but Unclassified Information
The Bush Administration also has revived Reagan-era initiatives based
on mosaic theory, although in a somewhat different format. In a program
reminiscent of NSDD 145, the Bush Administration encouraged
administrative agencies to safeguard and withhold sensitive information,
defined as government information "regarding weapons of mass
destruction, as well as other information that could be misused to harm the
security of our Nation and the safety of our people."' 19 The justification for
such a move was partially grounded in mosaic theory, as Bush
Administration officials feared that terrorists were culling public sources of
information to piece together government activity.'
20
These actions concern observers. No overarching legal framework
currently governs "sensitive but unclassified" information (which consists
of up to fifty-six separate designations and definitions by various
agencies),' 21 and agency officials must find that it falls within existing
FOIA exemptions to withhold such information. Even prior to the Bush
Administration's aggressive campaign, there was fear that this chaotic
scheme, with so little oversight, would result in excessive secrecy by
resulting in confusion and over-classification of material. 122 Some critics
involved and because the "investigations were exceedingly complex, requiring a nationwide
effort to obtain information regarding terrorist organizations, methodology, and personnel."
Id. at 41. To support its claim, the government cited to the portions of CIA v. Sims and
Halkin v. Helms discussing mosaic theory. Id. The federal court recently dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims regarding the illegality of the indefinite detention, but it made no mention
of mosaic theory. See Memorandum and Order, Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307
(JG), at 69-77 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), available at www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/rulings/
cv/2002/02cv2307mo-f.pdf (stating that the government's subjective intention to keep the
suspects in jail is immaterial since the "entire detention was authorized by the post-removal
period detention statute").
119. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and White
House Chief of Staff, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002),
http://www.fas.org./sgp/bush/wh03l902.html; see also Memorandum from Laura L.S.
Kimberly, Acting Director, Information Security Oversight Office to Departments and
Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/wh03l902.html (providing
guidelines on how to "safeguard information," including "sensitive but unclassified
information," by using measures such as "giving full and careful consideration to all
applicable FOIA exemptions").
120. See, e.g., Donald F. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Def., Cable to "RUHH Subscribers" (Jan. 14,
2003), http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/01/dodweb.html (describing an Al Qaeda manual
which detailed tactics of culling public sources and websites for Department of Defense
(DOD) information and cautioning personnel to "think[] about what may be helpful to an
adversary" when deciding what unclassified information to post on websites).
121. See National Security Archive, Pseudo-Secrets: A Freedom of Information Audit of
the U.S. Government's Policies on Sensitive Unclassified Information at 9 (Mar. 2006),
www.nsarchive.org (reporting that twenty-four of the thirty-seven surveyed agencies follow
their own "internally-generated policies"); Wells, supra note 51, at 1210-11 (discussing the
variety of definitions of "sensitive but unclassified" used by agencies).
122. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S.
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note that "a great deal of non-sensitive information is being withheld [since
the Bush Administration's campaign] that should be or previously would
have been released under FOIA." '123  Others note that the existing
haphazard framework inhibits sharing of information among government
agencies that is necessary to protect national security,124 a problem the
Bush Administration's campaign likely exacerbates.
In early 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) also proposed
legislation exempting from disclosure under FOIA "information in the
possession of DOD concerning weapons of mass destruction.,
12 5
Specifically, such information would have included that which assisted in
(1) "develop [ment], produc[tion], or us[e] of weapons of mass destruction,"
(2) "evading the detection or monitoring of the development, production,
use, or presence of [such] weapons," or (3) "disclos[ing] a vulnerability to
the effects of [such] weapon[s]. 126 The proposed legislation assumed that
many entities, both inside and outside the government, "operate[d] research
programs, chemical plants, nuclear power stations, medical treatment
facilities, and other activities that generate[d] information that easily could
assist a terrorist or other adversary to make or use a weapon of mass
destruction."'1 27 The DOD recognized that agencies often could withhold
such information under FOIA Exemptions 1, 2, or 4, but nevertheless
Doc. No. 105-2, at 29 (1997) (commenting that many officials reported classifying
information to shelter it).
123. National Security Archive, supra note 121, at 26. See JOHN BAKER ET AL., MAPPING
THE RISKS: ASSESSING THE HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION 123 (2004) (arguing that information was needlessly withheld
from public view after the Card directive because "very few of the publicly accessible...
sources appear useful to meeting a potential attacker's information needs").
124. See GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified
Information, at 6 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385 (suggesting
that the lack of oversight leads to a greater chance that the sharing of material will be
unnecessarily restricted).
125. See H.R. 5122, 109th Cong., §§ 923(a), (d)(2) (2006) (version introduced in the
House, Apr. 6, 2006) (proposing that such information be exempt from FOIA until its
"sensitivity ... can be reasonably confirmed"). According to the House Report, the DOD
originally proposed this provision, and the House agreed to incorporate it. See COMM. ON
ARMED SERV., NAT'L DEF. AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, H.R. REP. No. 109-
452 at 477-79 (2006) (printing the Department of Defense's letters to the House requesting
the bill's enactment).
126. H.R. 5122 § 923(d)(2).
127. See Federation of American Scientists, "Proposed DOD FOIA Exemption for
Unclassified WMD Information," available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/04/
dodfoia.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) (providing a section by section analysis of the
DOD's proposed exemption to FOIA).
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argued for a new exemption in cases where existing exemptions did not
apply. 128 In other words, the proposed legislation created an exemption for
sensitive but unclassified information.
Although the proposed law represented an improvement over the
Reagan-era's vague and amorphous definition of sensitive but unclassified
information, problems still existed. While the bill pertained only to
"weapons of mass destruction," it allowed for the restriction of information
that was only tangentially related to such weapons, but which had
substantial scientific or public health implications. Similarly, while the bill
provided that material could be withheld only as long as it was sensitive,
1 29
it provided no guidelines for making such determinations, thus granting a
great deal of discretion to agency officials. Finally, the bill preempted all
state and local disclosure laws,1 30 an action which failed to recognize that
"[p]ublic health officials and agencies in state and local governments and
outside government often have different, sometimes competing, public
health priorities." 131
Later iterations of the proposed legislation deleted this provision.
112
Nevertheless, the DOD's attempt to insert a limited sensitive but classified
provision into FOIA reveals the continuing problems that arise with
attempts to withhold information using such an amorphous concept.
b. USA PA TROTAct
At the behest of the Bush Administration, Congress also enacted
legislation with roots in the FBI's Library Awareness Program. Section
505 of the USA PATRIOT Act provided the FBI with greater leeway to use
national security letters to gather library user information, among other
things.1 33 Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI could issue NSLs to
128. See id. (reporting that Section 923 "would exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) certain information.., which does not also meet the
threshold for national security classification").
129. See H.R. 5122 § 923(a).
130. Id. § 923(c) (prohibiting state and local authorities from enacting laws dealing with
information subject to the section).
131. SUNSHINE IN GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE, DEFENSE SPENDING PROPOSAL WOULD
EXPAND SECRECY 2 (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.sunshineingoverment.org/DefenseFOIA.pdf
132. See H.R. 5122, 109th Cong. (2006) (version engrossed in the House (May 16,
2006)). A newer version of the bill instead contains a provision providing that "sensitive
but unclassified homeland security information in the possession of the Department of the
Defense" that is shared with state and local personnel in relation to terrorist activities as
required under the Homeland Security Act "shall not be subject to disclosure" under FOIA
simply because it was shared with other agencies. See John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, 109th Cong. § 1405 (2006) (engrossed
amendment as agreed by the Senate), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
C?c 109:./temp/-c 1 09Eoq4bv (discussing provisions recently adopted by Congress).
133. The FBI has the authority to issue compulsory NSLs in situations defined by
various statutes that do not require judicial or prosecutorial oversight. See Charles Doyle,
Administrative Subpoenas and National Security Letters in Criminal and Foreign
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obtain various telephone and electronic transactions records (for Internet
usage), financial records, and other consumer credit records.1 34 Section 505
of the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the FBI's power to issue NSLs,
allowing access to records after the FBI certified that it sought information
relevant to a "foreign counterintelligence investigation."' 135 The previous
standard required "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
that the customer or entity whose records [were] sought [was] a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power."' 136 The breadth of the government's
power under Section 505 to issue NSLs based on generalized suspicion,
combined with a provision prohibiting recipients from disclosing receipt of
an NSL, 137 essentially allowed the FBI to access library records of
individuals not suspected of terrorism in much the same way that the
Library Awareness Program operated. 38.
The government, however, justified the statute as a necessary
counterintelligence measure. 139  It also specifically justified the
nondisclosure portions of the statute with reference to mosaic theory.
According to government officials, "disclosure of the NSL recipient's
identity may... permit the subject of the NSL, or those involved [with] the
NSL, to deduce that the government is aware of [their] identity, leading
Intelligence Investigations: Background and Proposed Adjustments at 22-23 (Apr. 15,
2005), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32880.pdf (listing requirements FBI agents must meet
before they may issue an NSL).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000) (allowing FBI agents to gain subscriber information
from an "electronic communications service provider" only if there are "specific and
articulable facts.., that the person.., is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power"); 12
U.S.C. § 3414(a) (2000) (applying the same standard to financial institutions); 15 U.S.C.§ 168 1u(c) (2000) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to provide such information upon
the same standard).
135. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act § 505(b), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 365-66
(2001) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2000)) (amending the Financial Privacy Act
of 1978 to allow the FBI greater access to records).
136. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, § 404, Pub. L. No. 99-569, 100
Stat. 3190, 3197 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)).
137. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2000) (implementing a nondisclosure provision).
The Act did not contain an obvious provision providing for judicial review of NSLs.
138. Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act amendments noted that the amendments could
allow the FBI to access information regarding citizens' reading and Internet habits with very
little prosecutorial or judicial oversight. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: THE FBI's POWER TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL
BELONGINGS WITHOUT TELLING YOU 13 (2003), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/
16813pub20030730.html (warning that the FBI has used NSLs more freely since the 2001
law); Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the Lady from Toledo: Post-USA PATRIOT Act
Electronic Surveillance at the Library, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 449, 468 (2004) (suggesting that
"overcollection of information" frequently occurs); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1356 (2004) (discussing the
expansion of the government's power under the § 505 standard).
139. See Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A
Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 37,
41-54, 69 (2004) (discussing the legitimate counterintelligence function of NSLs).
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them to flee or go deeper under cover."'' 40 Furthermore, "while that piece
of information may appear innocuous by itself, it could still be significant
to a terrorist organization when combined with other information available
to it.
'141
Two district courts have rejected the government's assertion of mosaic
theory to support the non-disclosure provision, finding the theory either
inapplicable to the First Amendment challenge asserted 142 or conclusory
and unsupported by actual facts related to the particular claim involved.
143
As one court succinctly put it, mcsaic theory might be relevant when the
government
[a]sserts that secrecy is necessary for national security purposes in a
particular situation involving particular persons at a particular time.
Here, however, the Government cites no authority supporting the open-
ended proposition that it may universally apply these general principles
to impose perpetual secrecy upon an entire category of future cases
whose details are unknown and whose particular twists and turns may
not justify, for all time and all places, demanding unremitting
concealment and imposing a disproportionate burden on free speech.'
44
As a result of the issues raised in these decisions and the public outcry
over the NSL provisions, Congress recently amended them. The new
provision allows recipients to petition for judicial review modifying or
setting aside the NSL, requires FBI certification of a danger to national
security prior to imposing a nondisclosure requirement, and makes clear
that NSLs do not apply to libraries when they operate in their traditional
role. 145 Although the 2006 amendments provide some safeguards for
recipients of NSLs and library/Internet users, critics note that problems
remain. Perhaps most significantly, some critics note that the judicial
review and non-disclosure provisions are effectively meaningless because
140. See Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing the
government's reasons for wanting to keep Doe's identity confidential).
141. Id. at 77.
142. See id. at 77-78. See also Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (holding that the Government failed to cite relevant authority for its secrecy claim).
143. See id. at 78.
144. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25.
145. For a thorough discussion of these amendments, see Brian T. Yeh & Charles Doyle,
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis at 10-16
(Mar. 24, 2006), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf (discussing the recent restrictions
placed on NSLs).
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courts must treat as conclusive the government's certification that
disclosure may endanger national security. 146  Proponents of the law
defended this presumption using mosaic theory.
147
III. IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
The instances of non-FOIA invocation of mosaic theory reflect the
depths to which the theory has infiltrated the government's mindset.
Mosaic theory is no longer limited to government attempts to block FOIA
or discovery requests in the course of litigation. 148 Now, the government
invokes mosaic theory to rationalize closing deportation hearings,
indefinitely detaining non-citizens, restricting dissemination of non-
classified information, and secretly searching certain kinds of records,
including library and Internet records. In other words, the government uses
mosaic theory to justify the very bases of certain programs or actions.
Given the constitutional liberties at stake with such actions, this use of the
theory represents a significant step beyond refusal to provide information
in response to FOIA requests. No good can come from allowing the
government to assert mosaic theory unchallenged.
As noted above, recent invocations of the theory block questions about
these programs by arguing that revelation of information enables enemies
to hurt the United States and by casting those who question the government
as outsiders unable to assess the risk. Government officials support their
claims with little more than conclusory statements that terrorists, who are
smarter than judges or the public, will piece together the information, and
146. See id. at 14. In addition, although NSLs no longer apply to libraries in their
traditional role, a library providing Internet services beyond a certain undefined level is still
subject to NSL authority. Id. at 15. Moreover, the FBI also can obtain library records
through Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows the government to apply for a
court order accessing "any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents,
and other items)." See USA PATRIOT Act § 215, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 287
(2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(2000)). As with NSLs, observers criticize the breadth
of the government's power to obtain secretly such orders without meaningful oversight. As
with the NSL provisions, Congress curtailed some of the government's authority to access
such records in early 2006. To compare the law before and after the 2006 amendments, see
Mart, supra note 138, at 461-62 and Yeh & Doyle, supra note 145, at 4-10.
147. See 152 CONG. REc. S1395 (Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (expressing
concern that the absence of the rule would allow each judge to make a separate
determination regarding the harmful effects of the information to national security).
148. I do not mean to diminish FOIA's importance. Absent a judicially recognized
constitutional right of access to government information, FOIA is the primary source of
information about government operations. In this sense, FOIA is critical to democratic
accountability. See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 131, 144-45 (2006) (suggesting that
FOIA's purpose is to "make democratic participation and citizen oversight a reality"). My
point is simply that since FOIA litigation involves only requests for information, these
important democratic issues are less obviously at the forefront of litigation than in the non-
FOIA cases.
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use it to impede terrorism investigations.149 Officials make no genuine
attempt to identify the danger, or even possible alternative dangers, posed
by the information. 50 Rather, the government's argument suggests in some
sort of shadowy way that the very existence of the information poses the
danger; thus, it cannot fall into the wrong, or any, hands. As in the FOIA
context, invocation of mosaic theory is a non-response designed solely to
obtain a result-secrecy.
Unfortunately, the government's current use of mosaic theory effectively
reads constitutional liberties out of the balance. Government officials
apparently have determined that there is no acceptable risk of danger from
disclosure of information and that infringement of constitutional liberties is
an unavoidable side-effect of attaining that level of risk (although they
rarely say this out loud). This reasoning shows either a fundamental
misunderstanding of risk assessment (that is, the far-fetched belief that
suppressing information can reduce the risk of terrorism to zero), 15I an
underestimation of the value of constitutional liberties in our governmental
hierarchy, or a pretext to hide governmental misbehavior or accretion of
power. 152
Not surprisingly, courts hearing constitutional challenges to programs in
which the government has asserted mosaic theory have most often
questioned the government's arguments. 53  Faced with balancing
important liberties against the government's national security rationale,
those courts have rejected broad and unsupported assertions of mosaic
theory. Unfortunately, not all courts are so willing to question the
government. Instead, some defer to broad assertions of mosaic theory
149. See supra notes 93-118, 140-41 (discussing the government's frequent attempts to
invoke the mosaic theory without providing any compelling evidence).
150. See Ristroph & Jaffer, supra note 9, at 7 ("[Tlhe government need not explain even
the potential danger; it can simply assert that information might be 'significant' in some as-
yet-undetermined way.").
151. At least two issues arise here. First, can we reduce such risk to nothing? Second,
should this be our goal, or would it be counterproductive (for example, by interfering with
intelligence information sharing or intruding too much upon civil liberties)? See, e.g.,
MITRE Corp.-JASON Program Office, Horizontal Integration: Broader Access Models
for Realizing Information Dominance 25-26 (2004), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/
classpol.pdf (reporting an independent scientific advisory group's findings discussing the
need to switch from a paradigm minimizing risk to one maximizing information flow
subject to acceptable risk levels).
152. See Ristroph & Jaffer, supra note 9, at 7 (suggesting that mosaic theory makes the
government unaccountable because citizens cannot complain about abuses of which they are
unaware).
153. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 78 (D. Conn. 2005) (deciding that
the government's assertion of the mosaic theory was insufficient to support gag order); Doe
v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (determining that the government
provided no evidence to sustain its "open-ended proposition"); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that the government failed
to meet even the most deferential standard to justify closing the hearings), aff'd, 303 F.3d
681 (6th Cir. 2002).
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regardless of the constitutional liberties at stake. 154 With increasing
governmental assertion of the state secrets privilege-an area in which
courts routinely defer' 55-- one can expect that some courts will continue to
defer, even in cases that involve constitutional rights. 15 6 Moreover, courts
resolving FOIA litigation almost always defer to mosaic theory arguments.
Government actors appear unlikely to change their ways in the near future
based upon the actions of a few courts.
What are we to do about this? The answer begins with the FOIA cases
where mosaic theory originally took root. If we can convince judges to
exercise actual review over cases like Sims, forcing government officials to
justify their decisions with evidence or, at the very least, specifically
tailored arguments, about the need for secrecy, perhaps other courts will
take up the cause. Eventually, government actors may alter their behavior
as well. Imagine, for example, how things would have progressed if the
Supreme Court had decided Sims in a manner consistent with the lower
court opinions.
The district court in Sims was hardly hostile to the CIA. Rather, it
provided the CIA with numerous opportunities to offer evidence supporting
its Exemption 3 claim. 5 7 The district court sought to obtain a specific
explanation from the CIA so that the agency could not insulate its actions
from review by hiding behind a porous definition of "intelligence
source."' 58 Had the agency eventually been forced to provide such
information or abandon its claim of exemption it, and others watching the
case, would have realized the kind of justifications required to support a
national security withholding. Instead, the Supreme Court accepted the
CIA's invocation of mosaic theory and the notion that courts are not in a
position to see the "bigger picture" without asking any further questions.
The government's assertion of mosaic theory brought to a halt what had
been legitimate and thoughtful questions by the lower courts. 59
154. See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcrofl, 308 F.3d 198, 215-16 (3d Cir.
2002); see also supra notes 107-15.
155. But see Heptig v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing to
dismiss a lawsuit alleging that an NSA surveillance scheme violated First and Fourth
Amendment rights based upon the government's assertion of state secrets privilege).
156. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
159. The lower courts never discussed mosaic theory. The theory appeared in the
government's Supreme Court brief and then in the Supreme Court opinion. See Brief for
Respondents at 6-7, Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (No. 83-1249) (suggesting that the
Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to do more than protect information that is
already easily distinguishable as sensitive, and must sometimes "withhold superficially
innocuous information").
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As the lower court decisions in Sims reveal, courts need not treat mosaic
theory with such deference. One can allow assertion of the theory without
squelching questions. To do so, however, one must focus on a concrete
danger and its relationship to the information sought. Thus, courts should
require agency assertions of mosaic theory to specifically identify the threat
to national security, explain the potential causal link between the innocuous
information released and the harm to national security, and explain how
information already in the public domain, if relevant, does not undercut the
agency's assertion of mosaic theory. 1
60
Government officials must do more than blandly state, as they do in
much recent litigation involving national security, that release of
information will allow terrorists to impede terrorism investigations. In a
world in which terrorist investigations have occurred (and likely will
continue to occur for decades), an agency could endlessly use this excuse.
Instead, government officials must identify how the specific information
likely will play a role in impeding particular investigations by focusing on
potential, specific threats to those investigations, discussing the causal links
between the information and those threats, and determining the basis for
making particular inferences from the information in their possession.1
6
'
Similarly, in many instances, information sought via FOIA requests is
available or partially available through other sources, as in Sims and several
of the post 9/11 cases. The courts' reasoning that agencies may
nevertheless refuse to disclose such information for intelligence
purposes, 162 while perhaps sound in theory, fails to acknowledge that, in a
particular instance, information already in the public domain may
substantially undercut the agency's rationale regarding withholding. At the
very least, a court should require an explanation before it agrees to allow
withholding.
Recently, in Heptig v. AT&T, 163 the court took a slightly different
approach to determine whether information already widely reported by the
media nevertheless qualified as a state secret for litigation purposes.
160. 1 use the general term "national security" here for ease of discussion. One would
need to alter the questions depending upon whether the exemption involved classified
information or a specific withholding statute, such as the National Security Act's protection
of "intelligence sources and methods." There also may be additional questions courts could
ask. See sources cited infra note 167. These appear to be the three most important
assertions, however.
161. Alice Ristroph and Jameel Jaffer make a similar argument regarding the need for
specificity and additional justifications although they argue that such specificity would
"mean the end of the mosaic argument." Ristroph & Jaffer, supra note 9, at 7-8. To the
extent that they call for the abandonment of mosaic arguments altogether, I disagree that
such a move is likely or necessary. Obviously, however, courts and government officials
must abandon the current iteration of mosaic theory.
162. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
163. 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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According to the court, a statement in the public domain may still remain
secret if it "possesses substantial indicia of reliability [for instance, coming
from a reliable source such as the government] and whose verification or
substantiation possesses the potential to endanger national security."'1
64
Questions such as this may provide a reasonable way to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate government claims.
The above requirements are not unduly onerous. Intelligence agencies
are thoroughly familiar with the application of mosaic theory-not simply
the assertion of it in litigation. Thus, such agencies understand the need to
be concrete when constructing mosaics or guarding against their
construction. In fact, federal agencies practicing operational security
(OPSEC), an applied version of mosaic theory, explicitly recognize the
need for specificity in practicing counterintelligence-i.e., intelligence
activities designed to identify and counter threats to security. Accordingly,
such agencies list as part of their practices the need to (1) identify "core
secrets"-those "few nuggets of information" critical to the organization's
mission; (2) identify specific adversaries, their objectives, and their
capabilities; (3) analyze the organization's vulnerabilities; and (4) assess
particular risks by matching an organization's vulnerabilities to particular
threats.'65  Without specific identification of such issues, officials
understand both the uselessness of counterintelligence measures, because
they have nothing identifiable at which to aim, and that failure to
adequately identify risks wastes resources. 166
Courts taking the above approach to mosaic theory merely take a page
from the counterintelligence manuals of the agencies. 16  Requiring
164. Id. at 990.
165. DefendAmerica, An Operational Security (OPSEC) Primer,
http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/a021202b.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2006)
(discussing that the OPSEC process must determine information that would harm an
organization's ability to operate).
166. Id. ("The decision of whether to implement countermeasures must be based on
cost/benefit analysis and an evaluation of the overall program objectives.... If you don't
know what to protect, how do you know you are protecting it? The 'what' is the critical and
sensitive ... information that adversaries require to meet their objectives.").
167. Given courts' history of deference in FOIA cases involving national security-
especially mosaic theory cases-one rightfully wonders whether courts will ever exercise
more rigorous review. This may be an area in which Congress should involve itself, much
as it did after EPA v. Mink, to send some sort of signal to courts that the deference
associated with mosaic theory is not appropriate. Many avenues are available, including
(1) amending FOIA to set forth a judicial standard requiring consideration of the factors
discussed above (leaving some details to the courts depending on particular issues arising in
litigation), (2) amending the statute to include consideration of the public interest in
disclosure, along with the national security interest so courts have an incentive to consider
both sides of the liberty/security issue, (3) amending FOIA to require in camera inspection
and use of special masters to aid with sensitive, difficult and time-consuming document
review, and (4) amending FOIA to set up special courts or administrative bodies to deal with
FOIA issues initially, while still allowing resort to Article III courts. See Robert P. Deyling,
Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National Security Information
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agencies that want to withhold information to identify potential harm and
draw causal links to the release of apparently innocuous information is
consistent with how agencies perform OPSEC (if performed well).
Accordingly, agencies should already have done much of this work; if not,
or if they refuse to justify their invocation of mosaic theory, it suggests that
an agency uses the theory for other purposes or that officials lazily invoke
it as a talisman. A court faced with such a situation is entitled to request
more detailed support or, if it finds that avenue pointless, order disclosure.
The advantage of more rigorous judicial review goes beyond the
immediate effects of FOIA litigation. A more rigorous requirement forcing
agencies to justify their use of mosaic theory ideally will avoid much
litigation by resulting in better decisionmaking from the outset. 68 More
rigorous review of mosaic theory in the FOIA context also may affect the
government's current assertions of mosaic theory beyond FOIA. Once
Sims unquestioningly accepted mosaic theory, it became a powerful
weapon for the government in any national security context. If courts
clarified, however, that mosaic theory required justification and causal
connections, it would alter the entire backdrop for mosaic theory.
Government officials could no longer wield this blunt weapon to justify
such things as closure of immigration hearings, withholding non-classified
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 93-102, 105-11 (1992)
(discussing numerous ways to improve the litigation process for FOIA); Fuchs, supra note
148, at 173-75 (suggesting that in camera review will result in greater disclosure); Pozen,
supra note 9, at 677-78 (proposing the use of special masters or assistants to help with fact-
finding and evaluating the credibility of the government's claims); Wells, supra note 51, at
1218 n. 118 (suggesting possible use of a statutory balancing test favoring disclosure of even
properly classified information if the public interest in disclosure outweighs national
security needs). These are merely suggestions, all of which need greater exploration-each
has advantages and disadvantages. While occasional courts have undertaken some of these
tasks, see, e.g., Heptig, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (issuing order to show cause regarding the
possible appointment of a special master for assistance in assessing classified evidence
claims), Congress is the most logical body to undertake such an exploration. The critical
point is that its action should compliment the above suggestions, persuading courts that
complete deference is inappropriate. Of course, Congress also could consider much broader
issues, such as whether the exemptions themselves should be reconsidered or amended. See,
e.g., Wells, supra note 51, at 1217-20. But that is beyond the scope of this Article.
168. This argument assumes, consistent with psychological research on accountability,
that more rigorous judicial review could improve agency decisionmaking. See Jennifer S.
Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 255, 255 (1999) (theorizing that accountability encourages people to give
"compelling justifications" so that they may experience rewards). Such an assumption
needs more detailed exploration than this Article allows, but current use of mosaic theory
clearly does not make officials accountable in any sense of the word. Arguments exist that
judicial review can improve government decisionmaking in certain contexts. See Mark
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 508-09 (2002) (suggesting that "judicial review
provides accountability ... [when] courts examine the arguments pertaining to the validity
and care of the agency reasoning"); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L.
REV. 903, 939-49 (2004) (suggesting that judicial review might serve as a method of
accountability when civil liberties are at stake).
HeinOnline  -- 58 Admin. L. Rev. 877 2006
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
information, or secret records searches. Instead, precedents would exist
with far more specific requirements applicable only in specific
circumstances. It would take determined interpretive efforts for
government officials to find such specific requirements supportive of their
broader initiatives.
To be sure, government officials might make such efforts; with sufficient
motivation, one can justify almost anything. 69 However, officials seem far
more likely to continue believing that "a little knowledge is a dangerous
thing" under the existing regime of mosaic theory. Government actors
might alter their attitudes if courts required greater justification of their
actions. In an analogous situation involving free speech rights, evolution in
the Court's decisions appears to have changed the attitude of government
officials. During World War I, courts indicted and convicted thousands of
people because their speech had a "tendency" to cause interference with the
war effort.170 The Supreme Court originally reviewed such convictions
using a version of the "clear and present danger" test that, like the current
version of mosaic theory, deferred to the government's allegations of
harm."' Over time, however, the Court realized that its test provided no
protection against government overreaching and, as a result, imposed
stringent intent and causal requirements. 172  As the Court's cases have
evolved, so has the government's attitude. Although the Court is most
likely to defer to government officials' suppression of speech during
national security crises, government officials have not attempted to censor
criticism of the government under the guise of national security in recent
years, at least not as they attempted to do in 1917 or the Cold War.1 73 One
169. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 169 (1980) (discussing the phenomenon of motivated
reasoning, which occurs when individuals hold on to their beliefs even when presented with
clear evidence to the contrary).
170. See Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1919) (finding that
statements violated the Espionage Act if their "natural and probable tendency and effect"
was "such as are calculated to produce the result condemned by the statute"); see also
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (upholding a conviction for espionage
because speech was a "little breath [that was] enough to kindle a flame"). For a discussion
of the kinds of innocuous expression that resulted in criminal punishment during World War
1, see Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First Amendment, 101 MICI-1. L. REv. 1566, 1582-
84 (2003).
171. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.").
172. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that to
convict a person of advocating illegal violence, the government must show that the
expression is directed to and likely to incite or produce "imminent lawless action"); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (holding that "the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished").
173. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, War Fever, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1131, 1153 (2004) ("[T]he
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can conclude that court decisions, in addition to resolving disputes, send
broader signals to government actors who then internalize them.
Ultimately, that internalized standard may spread to areas outside the
immediate jurisprudence as well.
CONCLUSION
Whether one agrees with the ultimate outcome of Sims, the Court's
unquestioning acceptance of mosaic theory had significant ramifications in
and beyond the FOIA context. The decision reinforced a government
attitude that views information as dangerous simply because of its
possibilities. This effect, however, was not inherent in Sims. The Court
could have accepted mosaic theory while requiring some justification for
its assertion. Such an approach could have acknowledged the theory's
potential validity without elevating it to the level of unquestioning
deference. It might also have avoided expansion of that theory, and the
concomitant emphasis on secrecy-apparently at all costs-well beyond
the FOIA context.
efforts of government to suppress dissent have become both more subtle and less
effective.... [W]e have indeed come a long way."); Christina E. Wells, Information
Control In Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 451, 492-93
(2004) (noting that the current administration's censorship is still significantly more relaxed
than that from World War I or the Cold War). Some of the government's decision to forego
direct censorship simply may reflect an effort to find alternative, more subtle routes of
suppression. Even this, however, suggests somewhat positive change as it shows that
government officials have internalized court decisions and attempted to abide by the letter,
if not the spirit, of them. For a thoughtful discussion, see Stone, supra, at 1152-53. We
should, of course, remain vigilant regarding such alternate routes of suppression as any
positive change that results from the evolution of doctrine easily erodes if more subtle routes
of suppression go unchallenged.
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